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I- I^IEODOCTION
The advent cf ccmputer technology daring the previous
two decades has affected virtually every aspect of govern-
nenr and private industry. As technological advances fester
the availability of complex systems a- lower prices, -he
integration cf computer systems with governmental and indus-
trial processes is accelerated. Applications cf coiiipu-cer
systems range from relatively rou-me data processing tasics
such as payroll, accounting packages, and inventory control
to intricate scientific systems controlling space flights
and decision support systems assisting managers in resolving
unique problems.
The pervasiveness cf this technology has created many
new issues for management concern at all levels cf govern-
ment and industry. Among these issues is the subject of
security. As systems become more and more complex, organi-
zations which utilize thera ara becoming more and more depen-
dent upon them. This relationship is forci.ng
compu tar-center management to devote efforts toward improved
security in ail areas: hardware; software; communications;
perscEnel; and administration [Eef. 1]. It is useful to
consider exactly what we mean by the term "security" with
respect to ccmputer systems. According to Wylie, security
is "a state of mind reached when one's assets are receiving
appropriate protecticr. Protection has three facets cf equal
importance. Preventative techniques are applied to prevent
the occurence of threats. Detection techniques are applied
to ensure that all threat occurences are registered.
Finally, for every threat occurence there must be an appro-
priate response." [Ref. 2] These definitions present a
framework on which a computer system security plan may be

developed. It may net ba possibls to design a system which
defeats every intrusion attempx. However, an adequate goal
for many organizations might be to raise the cost cf unau-
thorized or illegal use of a system to an amount so high
that it discourages any attempts. While this goal is being
pursued viith vigor today, contemporary literature is replete
with examples of computer crime. The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce estimates that if computer abuse grows proportion-
ally with the number of computers in operation, there will
be roughly $160 million annual loss by 1985 [ Ref . 3].
Government agencies at all levels and private enter-
prises, especially banks, must be concerned with the threat
of sabotage and disruption, not only theft. The financial
institutions participating in •^he electronic fund transfer
sytem (EfTS) in the U.S. handle amounts of money equal to
the national debt every four days [Ref. U]. The potential
for economic disaster of enormous magnitude exists. The
motivation to prevent large-scale penetration and disruption
of systems such as EJTS is providing impetus for security
research
.
The need for computer system security is self-evident.
The magnitude of the problem is enormous. Partial solutions
to this problem are being addressed in all areas. For
example, software houses have developed sophisticated data
access control packages. Many hardware vendors are
including some type of security-control feature m their
products. The issue of computer security, however, is not
confined to technical considerations alone. Management must
become intimately involved in this area if meaningful
progress is to be made. A commitment by top management,
clearly indicating to the entire organization the emphasis
that iiust be placed upon security, is necessary. Management
at all levels must be involved with determining policy and
implementing measures concerning the organization of a
10

computer security program, security admiri s^ration, risk
assessments, personnel practices, and back-up, recovc-ry and
disaster planning.
The federal government, including both civilian and
military ag€ncies, is the largest user of ADP facilities in
the country [Ref. 5]. Computer usage spans a vasx diversity
of applications such as World-Wide Military Command and
Conrrcl System (WWMCCS) , Social Security Sysxem, communica-
tions, federal payrcll and accounting systems, 9tc. This
immense usage has logically gena-rated interest in the
security of these particular computer systems. In fact, the
artenticn being devoted to the security of computer systems
is so great that the Office of Mandgeraent and Budget estab-
lished requirements in 1978 that, among other things, every
agency inplement a computer security program. OflE also
defined a minimum set of controls to be incorporated into
each agency's computer security program. [Ref. 6]
Ccntempcrary literature on computer security seems to be
in agreement in expressing the view that the best approach
to computer security is the "total systems" approach.
Critical areas which must be examined include hardware,
software, users, pr cgrammmers, data, input/output documents,
and procedures. Other facets of a system pertinent to a
particular organization may also need to be examined. One
element of the "total systems" approach is the conduct of a
risk assessment.
What is a risk assessment? Many texts cffer definitions
which differ slightly in scope and degree. Perhaps the most
concise and applicable is Peter Browne's definiticn: "A
risk assessment is an analytic process designed to quantify
the DF (data processing) security required by an organiza-
tion. It considers the threats to information and the loss
that would occur if a threat were to materialize." [Ref. 7]
The results cf a risk assessment enable an organization to
11

consider solutions to security problems which ar= ccst.-
€ffectiv€. The solutions may eiz'asr artempt to reduce -he
probability of threats, lessen the effects of various
threats, cr aid in the recovery from a "succsssful" threat.
An organization may be able to conduct its own internal
risk assessment if personnel assets are available.
Specialists in computers, security, finance, personnel and
operations will be required. Contracts may be utili7ed with
one of several commercial companies organized to conduct, or
to provide limited assistance, in risk assessments. Chapter
Three will address this issue in depth. Of course, tne
active participation cf management is crucial.
A risk assessment is a dynamic concept. It should be
revised periodically to account for any changes in equip-
ment, software, operating procedures, cr any different
element which might affect the overall security of the
system. In particular. Naval activities with computer
systems aie required to update their risk assessments at
least evcry five years [ Ref . 8].
The federal government, as well as business enterprises,
must approach the security problem in an economical manner.
The risk assessment provides a logical framework to conduct
a rational analysis. Management must provide guidelines to
reach answers to the following questions:
1) What are the specific results requirsd; how much
security is required?
2) What is the proper balance between security program
cost and potential benefits?
3) When tradeoffs can be mada between protection and
recovery, hew much effort should be expended on
each? [Ref. 9]
Obviously the minimum amount cf security needed is to
protect those items that are required to keep the organiza-
tion operating. The security manager should incorporate
12

into thr security plan thoss functions which are supported
by computer facilities and essential zo the continued opera-
tion of the organization. Additional elements may also be
protected if it is economically feasible for the organiza-
tion. A cost-benefit analysis may be applied re the
decision-making process concerning additional security
measures.
In a risk analysis situation, it is necessary to iden-
tify and assess the degree of threat against the computer
resources of the organization. The degree of threat may
determine the need for protection of some asset. The amount
and cost of effort tc be expended in examining particular
threats should be proportional to the potential loss caused
by such thriats. Threats can usually be grouped into one or
more cf the following categories:
1) natural hazards and accidents such as fire, earth-
quakes, hurricanes, etc.
2) internal accidents and breakdowns such as programmer
and operator errors, hardware failures, etc.
3) violent intentional actions such as sabotage,
strikes, etc.
U) ncn-violant intentional actions such as fraud,
embezzlement, and theft. £aef. 10]
The potential loss associated with each threat must also
be examined . Some consistent quantifying standard must be
applied to each threat so that comparisons between losses
can be made. Similar to threats, losses may also be grouped
into four general categories:
1) delayed processing- the expense incurred when a
computer application is not processed on time .
2) less of data processing assets- these are the orga-
nizational assets in the custody of the data processing
unit. Data are the most valued assets and loss of data
may cause irreparable harm.
13

3) less of organization assats by means of coraputar
applications-wh€n assets such as accounts receivable,
negotiable securities, etc., are controlled by a
computer, they are vulnerable to fraud and manipala-
ticn.
U) loss of data confidentializy- disclosure of personal
cr proprietary data to unauchorized persons can cause
economic loss, dilution of planning efforts, loss of
employee morale, and legal action. [Ref. 11]
The po-enxial threats and t:he losses associated wi-h each
threat must be considered together. 2ach pairing of threat:
and less should te ranked according -o their iapact upon -che
organization. After this ranking has been developed, th^
process of examining cost-effective countermeasures can be
studied.
This chapter has provided an overview of the nature of
the computer security problem today. In particular, the
concep- of risk assessments has been introduced and its
potential benefits to organizations have been considered.
The subject of risk assessment and related ideas will be
addressed in greater detail in later chapters. Chapter Two
will detail the history and evolution of risk assessment
requirements within the Department, of Defense and the
Department of the Navy. Chapter Three will examine various
points which must be considered when an organization is
deciding whether zo do an "in-house" risk assessment, cr to
contract this function with a commercial company. A general
framework for conducting a risk assessment at the Naval
Postgraduate School will be discussed in Chapter Four. The
framework will be based upon the guidelines promulgated in
OPNAVINSI. 5239. 1A. Chapter Five will examine how to
design a decision support system to assist management in
conducting a risk assessment. Basic design modules will be
presented and some particular problems associated with data
14

tase fflanagement will ba ccnsidersd. Tha field of ccmputar
security in general, and risk assessments in particular/ has
advanced to such a degree that several companies new offer
automated risk assessment sySwems. A brief consideration of
these systems and a comparison of their attributes vis-a-vis
manual systems will also be presented in Chapter Five. The
final chapter will summarize the pertinent points covered in
this thesis. Some conclusions will be drawn about the state
of risk assessments m the modern organizational environ-
ment. Lastly, some recommendations to improve the effective-




II. DEPABTSENT OF DE|ENSE/D gPABTtlZNT OF THE NA7I DIRECTIVES
A. GENEBAL
From the outset, the Federal Government has beer, a
pioneer in the development of advanced corapurer systems.
"The first successful large scale data processing installa-
tion was [r.ade in the early fifties at the Census Bureau, and
the initial impetus toward programming languages for busi-
ness applications came from Department, of Defense support of
the COBOL programming language in the sixties" [Hef. 12].
From that point en, the rapid growth of computer technology
and the gcv=mraent's reliance on accurate computing systems
rose at an exponential rate. Poor accounting and managerial
conircl practices, however, have brought about extreme inac-
curacies in the data pertaining to computer hardware and
software inventories held by the Federal Government. In
1976, estimates of the amount of money spent on data
processing were decidedly vague. "The General Accounting
Office (GAG) was able only to bracket Federal Data
Processing spending as between 33 billion and $10 billion
annually. Mere recently, the Office of Management and Budget
(0MB) has cited a figure of $5.5 billion, and the General
Services Administration (GSA) has estimated the cost of
software development and maintenance alone at $2.2 billion."
[Ref. 12] A large percentage of these expenditures were
attributed to the DCD. In 1931, tae number of installed
computer systems was estimated to be around 15,000, while
the number of personnel working in the computer field was




sines the scianc-a cf computer tschnoloqy was a rela^ivsly
naw phsriCnenon at thB tiraa zhs governman- began -o axclcrs
its pcssifcilities, the dayslopmant oz gov^rnmen- coaiputar
systems was done in a rather piecemeal fashion, with little
regard to the managerial aspects of designing and imple-
menting computer systems. The emphasis was on buying/
davelcping and getting rhe systems into operation as fast as
possitle in ordar to show that a functional entity nad
resulted from all rh-r monetary and personnel resources thar
had been expended. As a result, of uhis mismanagement (or
rather ncn-management)
,
governman":: agencies were faced with
computer systems that were inflexible, inaccurate, and
subject to rapid obsclesence. The public outcry over the
amount of tax dollars spent on mismanaged computer resources
led the Federal Gcvernment to issue policy directives
addressing computer management, from the initiation of
requirements analysis to final test and implementaticn.
B. GCVEHNMENT C0NCE5NS
At afccut this same time, there was a growing concern
over th= security vulnerabilities inherent; in these new
computer systems. Although hardware and software technology
had been progressing at a rapid rate, little consideration
had been given to computer security technology. However,
with the ErcoJcs Act cf 196 5, the Office of Management and
Budget (CMB) had been assigned r esponsibili-ies for the
oversight and policy-making functions applicable to computer
systems development and acquisition. Thus, "in 1972, -- 0MB
urged private industry -- hardware nianufacturers, software
houses and related service industries — to make greater
capital investmer.xs in computer security. At the time, the
Federal Government v»as concerned that its inability to
protect data in computer systems -- except at very great
17

6xp9ns€ -- was limiting iis abili-y -o realize the bei^efjits
cf tschnclogy. " [Ref. 13] In Decamber of -hat sans y = ar,
the Department of Defense issued DDD Directive 5200.23 enti-
tled "Security Requirements for Automatic Data Processing
(ADP) Systems". The purpose of the directive was to estab-
lish "uniform policy for protecting classified data stored,
processed, or used in, and classified information communi-
cated, displayed, or disseminated by an Automatic Data
Processing (ADP) system" [Ref- 14]. Although DOD 5200.28
does not directly address risk assessments, it does require
that the heads of DOE components provide for the appointment
of an ADE Security Officer, who will later play an important
role in conducting rislc assessments for Navy computer
facilities.
*
In the mid-1970* s, 0MB became even more concerned with
encouraging the growth of computer security technology since
the Privacy Act of 1974 set "forth a series of requirements
governing Federal agency personal record-keeping practices"
[Ref- 15]. These requirements increased the need to provide
security for the personal data maintained in Federal
computer systems.
C- LEGISLATION
The Brcoks Act also assigned otner agencies responsibili-
ties for ccntributing to the Federal ADP Programs, The
National Bureau of Standards (NBS) , under the Secretary of
Commerce, was tasked with providing "leadership, technical
guidance, and coordination of government efforts in the
devalcpment of guidelines and standards" [Ref- 19]. in
iThe terms "Risk Analysis" and "Risk Assessment" can be
used interchangeably. While early government directives used





areas pertaining to ADP and ADP Security. The basic philo-
sophy brhind the NBS work in ADP security was reflected in
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS
PUB) 31 of June, 1974: "Data confidentiality and computer
security are dependent upon the application of a balanced
set cf managerial and technological safeguards. Within -che
context of a total security program, the NBS is pleased to
provide guidelines for ADP Physical Security and Pisk
Management avilacle for use by Federal agencies" [fief. 19].
The ccncepr of Risk Ma nagemeni was introduced at this
time to provide federal agencies with guidelines for
applying management principles to the risks associated with
the acquisition cf hardware and software. Although FIPS PUB
31 specifically addresses physical security programs, it
also touches upon procedural aspects, contingency planning,
supporting utilities, computer reliaoility, disaster prob-
abilities, security awareness programs, and risk analysis
methcdolcgies. This publication was one of the first to
provide specific recommendations on implementing comprehen-
sive computer security programs. It is important to note,
however, that its contents were strictly composed of recom-
mendaticns and guidelines - they did not constitute a
government directive mandating computer security require-
ments on government agencies. The publication was edited by
Susan K. Reed of the Systems and Software Division of NBS.
She later authored a government document on conducting risk
analyses which would be included as an addendum to DOD
5200. 28-M, the Department of Defense ADP Security ilanual.
This lanual will be discussed in more detail in a subsequent
section.
It is interesting to note that FIPS PUB 31, published in
1974, covers in great detail those security practices that
are advocated by more recent publications. Unfortunately,
19

the publication has te^n overshadowed by currenr dizrctives
that dictate what must be done but nox how to do i*. For
example, conventional risk assessments require an analysis
of the fctential threats to an ADP facility caused by wind-
storms, hurricanes, and tornadoes. Such informa-icn could
conceivably be obtained from the National iieather Service,
but it is already provided in FIPS PUB 31. In Key West,
Florida, zc be specific, the annual probability that a
hurricane will occur is 13% [Ref. 20]. This figure could be
used as direct input to the threat analysis form for the
current CCD-advocated risk assessment methodology.
To start a security prcgrara, the FIPS encourages all
government agencies tc "perform a preliminary risk analysis
to identify major problem areas and select interia security
measures as needed to correct major problem areas"
[Ref. 21]. The idea behind this is that, sinca computer
security is an cngoing process, the most obvious security
problems should be handled in an expeditious manner - agen-
cies need net and should not wait until a comprehensive risk
assessment has been ccmpieted prior to tackling the serious
security frcblems. In the meantime, a preliminary assess-
ment should be done to help isolata those problems.
The actual risk assessment methodology presented in the
FIPS is a scund one. It gives an excellent overview of the
means by which a risk assessment may be conducted, complete
with charts, tables, and figures that the user may apply in
calculating the final Annual Loss Expectancy (AL2) value.
However, the publication is somewhat weak when it comes to





Before gcing into ths specific risk asssssraen-, a'=-hci-
ology outlined in the FIPS, it is appropriate to define
certain terms which ars common to mosz, if r.ct all,
government-endorsed risk assessment methodologies :
IHREST -an overt or covert activity which may cause
less or damage tc a computer facility;
LOSS -the potential for being deprived of computer
assets or services;
VOLNEBABILITY -the weakness inherent in a computer
system, which makes it susceptible to loss or damage;
ANNUAL LOSS EXPECTANCY (ALE) -an estimate oi the airount
cf money that a computer facility could potentially
lose in a year if threats against the facility were
realized.
E. FIPS POB 31 METHODOLOGY
The FIPS methodolgy is basically a three-step process :
1.) Make an estimate of the potential losses to which the
computer facility is exposed; 2.) Perform an analysis of the
threats which may be made against the facility; ^nd 3.)
Combine the estimates of potential loss and probability of
loss tc produce an ALB value.
^ • Hstimatinq Less
Step one, estimates of potential losses, is to be
done in terms cf five distinct categories : "(1) physical
destruction or theft of physical assets; (2) loss or
destruction of data and program files; (3) tneft of informa-
tion; (4) theft of indirect assets; and (5) delay or preven-
tion of computer processing" [ 9ef - 21]. The end products of
21

this procedure are an iden- ificarion of the comparer facili-
ty's assets and dollar values for loss estimates.
Cf the five categories listed, the first is undoub-
tedly the mcst straightforward. Replacemenu costs for such
items as hardware, ccmmunications equipaent, supplies, and
the building itself should be entered into -he command's
inventory files as required by QSk. Unfcr-.unately, many
federal agencies have neglected to maintain inventory files
over the years. One of the fringe benefits of a risk
assessment is that such inventories mus* be generated, thus
enhancing a command's resource managemen*: capabilities.
Once these inventories have been made available, the esti-
mate cf less for a particular piece of equipment corresponds
to its replacement cost. For example, if a high-speed line
printer costs $5000 , then its loss estimate would be the
same - the command has the potential for losing $5000 if the
printer were to be destroyed or stolen.
In the second and third categories, less or destruc-
tion of data and program files and theft of information, a
great deal cf ambiguity occurs. The question wnich must be
answered is : what is the value of the data contained in the
computer system ? This is a question which has received a
great deal of attention in recent years. The Commander,
Naval Data Automation Command (C0MNA7DAC) , spent a signifi-
cant amount cf time and money in trying tc bring the ques-
tion of the value of data into perspective. Seme
consideration was given to standardizing data value based on
the number cf lines cf code and/or security classification.
A single line of code in a 100-line program file might be
valued at $10, fcr example. The loss or destruction cf the
file would thus contribute $1000 to the agency's ALE. In
essence, it would cost the command $1000 to reconstruct the
file. In a similar manner, a word of SECRET or lOP SEC2ET
22

ccd9, if compromised or sroler., might be valued at ilOO and
$200 respectively. Ey standardizing these values, ccmputing
the 5LE for most types of computer software would be a
simple matter of mathematical calculation, with lines of
code (the amount of money it would cost a programmer to
reproduce the code) being an absolute value, and classified
code representing a relative value. In theory, s-'ich aethcds
have a sound basis. In practice, however, the application
of such methods has proven to be rather unrealisxic. In
fact, CCMNAVDAC has recently abandoned :.ts attempts to
provide for standardization in favor of more practical
methcds.
"If zhe ADP system is used to control other assets
such as cash, items in inventory, or authorization for
performance of services, then it may also be used to st.sal
such assets." [Ref. 22]. These assets are known as indi-
rect assets, and their loss estimate corresponds to the real
value of the asset.
In estimating the potential loss caused by t.he delay
cr prevention of computer processing, several considerations
mus- be addressed. Some losses may be est;ijiaxed in a rela-
tively straightforward manner. Obvious examples involve a
failure to process payment checks promptly, thereby
preventing the exercise of a prompt payment discount under a
procurement contract, or delays in an inventory system which
may lead to idle manpower at a warehouse [Ref. 22]. In a
situation where a computer facility functions as a service
agency, the loss estimate would be based on the revenues
lost as a result of the customers being denied access to the
computer sysxem. On the other hand, "...in those situations
where a delay would more or less halt operations of an
agency, .. .use the daily operating cost of an agency as a




In gsr.eral, -here are time ranges or limits within which
loss estiicates will differ. If service is denied but -.he
system can te brought back up witain a reasonable amcun- of
time, it is possible that no loss will be incurred during
that time p=riod. However, after a certain p^ricd of rime
during which the computer system has noz been returned to
service, losses will be incurred, and in general, such
losses will grow in proportion to the duration of the delay.
The FIFS PUB stresses the importance of establishing "his
"maximum 'no loss* delay time and an estimate of rhe iiedian
time to reconstruct the AD? facility after total destruc-












C Yes No No Extreme
E Yes Yes Yes Moderate
V Ho Yes Yes Moderate
1 No Yes Yes Low
Q No No No Very Low
made, then the time period can be divided into various
ranges and less estimates can be assigned accordingly.
After conducting a preliminary estimate of all potential
losses, the task might be simplified by presenting the
collected data in tabular form, as shown in Table I




Sources for Threat Information
Sources of
Thraat Inforaation
Fire Building fire mar-
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Power Failure Building Engineer
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ADP Hardware Hardware vendors
Failure and Federal Supply
Service
Intruders, Building manager.
Vandals, etc. security director









Inrernal Theft System Design, In-









2 • S ya luat
i
nq Threats
In proceeding with th€ sscond step of th9 risk
assessment, that of evaluating the threats >^ainst th? ADP
facility, the ADP Security Planner (i=. the person respon-
sible for conducting the overall risk assessment) should
solicit the help of fire marshals, hardware vendors, other
govercment agencies, in house personnel, and/or any agency
or person who might contribute inputs to a threat evalua-
tion. Table II provides a list of sources of information
for different categories of threats.
although the FIPS gives little information on the
specific numerical figures to use in quantifying threats, it
does provide specific guidance on determining threat crcb-
abilities. Figure 2.1, for example, a seismic risk map of
the United States, gives the user a rough idea of the long-
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3- Calculating the Ann ual Loss ExQactancy (ALE)
The final step in the risk assessment prcc=ss
itself, although follow-on action is understood, involves
the detezniination of the ALE. This can be accomplishsd (and
most readily und=rstcod) by constructing a matrix of -hreats
and the Icsses vhich might be associated wi-h them. Table
III shows a computation for estimating the expected Icsses
that night te caused by fire damage.
Construction cf such a table is a ccmmcn procedure
in cperaticns research and aanagement sciences where the
objective may bs to ainimize losses (as in this case) or
maximize profits. The occurrence probabilities shown (.10,
.05, .005) may be derived by analyzing the facility's fire
safety precautions, a procedure for which the FTPS PUB gives
detailed guidance.
The dollar amounts for loss may be computed as
described earlier in the chapter. Once these figures have
been made available, estimates for the total potential loss
and the annual loss for each category can be calculated by
multiplying the occurrence probability by the loss figures.
Similar tables can be constructed for natural disasters such
as earthquakes, tornadoes, volcanic eruptions, floods, and
others.
Open completion of the estimation of the ALE for all
categories cf less, the security manager should have a
clearer understanding of the coupling of threats and Icsses
within his facility. He is then in a position to prioritize
his work in the area of computer security ccuntermeasures.
In general, remedial measures should be applied to those
areas in which the loss potential is the greatest. The end
result, then, of the risk assessment process is a cost-











































Todil potential 1o*^ , , 97.000 137,000 S.686.000
Ajlflnill Inaif S 9,T00 i 9,800 1 3,342
•
cf a specific computsr security weakness. If, for exaipis,
the ALE fcr building damage cajsed by fire is $ 9,700 , the
agency should be willing to spend up zo -hat amcunt in
providing remedial measures to lessen that loss potential.
The risk assessment will thus provide tne security manager
with the ammunition he needs to get top management support
on funds fcr security countermeasures.
The preceding synopsis of the FI?S methodology might seem
to De, as presented, a relatively straightforward process.
However, the FIES FOB clearly states, "...this is not an
exact science. Indeed, it is quite likely that cne will
have to reappraise threats and losses more than once,
concentrating on the areas initially identified as most
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critical, before the less expectancy estimate reacn^s a
satisfactory level of confidence." [ Ref - 23]
The level of detail provided for the above FIPS PUB meth-
odology will serve as a point of reference for descriptions
of subsequent methodclogies . Other risk assessment metho-
dologies will be discussed in terms of how they differ from
the one described in FIPS PD3 31.
F. SOBSZQOENT GOVERNMENT DIRECTIVES
Shortly after the release of FIPS PUB 31, the Privacy Act
of 197a was enacted. O.'lB Circular A-108, distributed six
months later, was written to assign responsibilities for the
security cf the personal records maintained by Federal agen-
cies. Under this directive, the term "system of records"
was defined as "...a group cf any records under the control
cf any agency from which information is retrieved by the
name of the individual or by some identifying number,
symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the
individual" [Ref. 16]. Since computer and word processing
systems are perfect vehicles for data storage and retrieval,
it was and is only natural that they would be used for the
maintenance of personal records. A-108 further mandated
that reasonable administrative, tecnnical, and physical
safeguards are established to ensure that personal records
are only disclosed to those who are authorized to have
access to them [Ref- 17]. This implies that security coun-
terraeasures must be in effect for ail federally-owned
computer systems maintaining personal data- The directive
also required that the GSA "revise computer and telecommuni-
cations procurement policies to provide that agencies must
review all proposed equipment and services procurements to
assure compliance with applicable provisions of the Act"
[Ref. 18]. This was the first of many government directives
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£^5iiilii:a "that federal agencies address security issaes in
their ccmpater develccaer.t and acquisition plans. Hctf=ver,
outside of FIPS PUB 31, the distribution and knowledgs of
which was very limited, -he Federal Governmenr was slew to
document specific policies and procedures for iaplemer.'iing
computer security programs.
Finally, three years later in July, 1978, O^IB Circular
A-71, entitled "Security of Federal Automated Information
Systems", was approved for distribution. In ganaral, the
purpose of A-7 1 was to promulgate "policy and responsibili-
ties for the development and implementation of computer
security programs by executive branch departments and agen-
cies" [Ref. 24]. This circular documented the requirement
that pericdic risk assessments be conducted by each federal
agency operating a computer facility. Although A-71
provided no guidelines on how to conduct a risk, assessment,
it did require that a risic assessment be carried cut or
revised under any of the following conditions :
1.) prior to the approval of design specifications for
new computer installations;
2.) whenever there is a major change to the physical
facility, hardware or software; or
3.) at periodic intervals of time, not exceeding five
years, if no risk assessment has be£ii performed dur-
ing that time.
[Hef. 25]
This directive had serious consequences for all federal
agencies. For most agencies, the third condition was the
one under which the risk assessments would be conducted.
Those agencies which had yet to perform a risk assessment
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interpre-t-id the condition as meaning -hat they had a five-
year deadline on the requirement;. Unf ort'inazely , rhis
slowed response from many federal agencies.
To promulgate the requirements of A-71, the Department of
the Navy issued OPNAVINST 5239.1 in April, 1979. This
instruction specified the A-71 requirements for all DON
activities. Although the instruction did little to augment
the policies provided by A-71, it did require that all DON
activities operating computer installations appoint an AD?
Security Officer who would be responsible for ensuring that
a risk assessment would be conducted on a periodic basis.
Two relevant enclosures that were included as part of
CPNAVINST 5259.1 were DOD 5 200.28-M entitled "Techniques and
Procedures for Implementing, Deactivating, Testing, and
Evaluating Secure Resource- Sharing ADP Systems", and a set
of guidelines for conducting risic assessments which was
edited by Susan K. Heed. The former, constituting the DOD
ADP Security Manual, provided standardized guidelines for
securing computer systems - it did not address risk assess-
ments; the latter, however, provided an excellent generic
framework for conducting risk assessments. It's merit was
more in facilitating the security officer's understanding of
the risk assessment lodel than in the actual methodolgy
proposed. The technique presented by the methodology is
similar to that presented in FTPS ?(J3 31, but is a more
mathematically-oriented model. These guidelines were later
released in August, 1979, as FIPS PUB 65, "Guideline for
Automated Data Processing Hisk Analysis".
G. FIPS PDB 65 METHCEOLOGT
In general, FIPS PUB 65 "explains the reasons for
performing a risk analysis, details the management involve-
ment necessary and presents procedures and forms to be used
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for risk analysis ard cost effective svaluation cf saia-
guards" [R9f. 26]. Onlike FIPS PUS 31, this NBS publication
giv9s no guidance on estimating specific loss prcfcatilities
(i€. there are no seismic risk maps or tables with hurricane
probatilities for various regions) , but it does provide a
better and more detailed explanation of the quantitative
measures and forms required for a zisK. assessment. In
short, FIFS PDB 65 covers the ambiguities present in FIPS
FUB 31. The two in ccmbinaticn provide a powerful framewcrk
under which a viable risk assessment can be conducted.
Like most methodologies, the one advocaxad by FIPS PUB 65
reccicirends that a prelicninary security analysis be perfomted
in order to identify a computer installa-^ion • s assets,
threats, vulnerabilities, and thus, the facility's security
posture. Three specific products will result frcm this
preliiBinary analysis :
1.) a list of asset replacement costs;
2.) a list of threats to which the facility is vulner-
able; and
3.) a list of existing security measures. [Hef. 27]
These products, once assigned quantitative measures, will
form the basis for the computation of the ALE (s) .
The next step in the FIPS methodology is to quantify the
measures for impact and the frequency of occurrence for
threats. The impact cf an event is defined as the exact
amount cf damage it could cause, while the frequency of
occurrence refers to the exact number of times xhe event
could occur- [Ref. 28] The common denominator selected for
the measures is monetary value, and a year is the time
period against which frequencies of occurrence will be
assessed. To simplify such quantitative measures, estimates
33

for impact and frequency are rounded off to factors of --n.
The range cf measures for both caiiegories is shown in Tacle
IV.
TABLE IV








Once in 300 years





3 years {1000 days)
100 ^days
10 da y s
per iay
10 times per dav
100 times per day
The FIES emphasizes that roundrng off the figures will
not have a significant effect on the overall ALE. The rele-
vance lies in orders of magnitude rather than in absolute
figures. Thus, "there will be nc significant difference in
the overall exposure whexher the damage from a certain event
is estimated at 1110,000 or $145,000 (or) if the
frequency of an event is expected to be twelve times a year
cr thirty" [ Ref- 29]- Once the impact and frequency
measures have besn determined, the ALE can be readily calcu-
lated using the following formula :
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LOSS = IMPACT (I) X FREQUENCY OF OCCnRRENCE (F)
To use this formula, however, it Is first necessary to
index the impact (i) and the frequency (f) measures from
Table IV. The resulting indices are shown in Table V,
TABLE 7
Table for Selecting of Values of i and f
If the estimated cost impact of the event is
$10, let 1 = 1$100, let i = 2
$1000, let 1 = 3
$10,000, let 1 = 4$100,000, let 1=5
$1,000,000, let 1=6$10,000,000, let 1=7
$1 00,000,000, let 1=8
If the estimated frequency of occurrence is
Once in 300 years, let f = 1
Onca in 30 years, let f = 2
Once in 3 years, let f = 3
Once in 100 days, let f = 4
Once Id 10 days, let f = 5
Once per day, let f = 6
10 times per day, let f = 7
100 times per day, let f = 8
1 1
To use the indices in the previous equation, they must firs-
be related to Impact (I) and Frequency of Occurrence (F) ,
Such relationships are expressed in the following equa-
tions :
i
for Impact, I = 10
(f-5) f
for Frequency, F = 10 /3 = 10 /3000
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Thus, if the impact of an event is esrimatad at $100 (i=2
i . -2
from Table V) then I = 10 =10 = 100. Similarly, :n9
frequency of occurrence is estimated to be once psr day
(f=6) , then F = 10 /3000 = 10 /3000 = 333.3.
Consider the following practical 3xampl9, where the
potential impact of a hurricane is $100,000 in damage to a
computer facility, and the frequency for a hurricane is once
in thirty years. The ALE would then be compuusd as fellows :
IMPACT : 5100,000 (i=5)
I = 10 = 100,000
FREQUENCY : 1/30 years (f=2)
2
F = 1C /3000 = .0333
LOSS: I X F = 100,000 x .0333 = 3,330
Thus, the ALE resulting from a hurricane would be approx-
imarsly 13,000-
It is no+ necessary, howvever, zc compute the ALE using
these tedious and cumoersome equations. The FI?S FUB
provides figure 2.2 to facilitate the process. The ALE for
a particular event can then be found at the intersection of
the values estimated for impact and frequency.
When all ALEs have been calculated, the FTPS PUB suggests
that the approach to the remainder of the task be done in an
orderly and structured manner. In short, it recommends that
"...the risk analysis task is better approached from the
standpoint of the data files, or applications systems, of



















































1 2 3 4 3 6 7 8
1 $300 $3,000 $300k
2 $300 $3,000 $30k $300k $3M
3 $300 $3,000 $30k $300k $3M $30M
4 $300 $3,000 $30k $300k $3M $30M
3 $300 $3,000 $30k $300k $3M $30M $300M
6 $3,000 $30k $300k $3M $30M $300M
7 $30k $300k $3M $30M $300M
8 $300k $3M $30M $300M
J
Figure 2.2 Ccmbinad Matrix of i, t, and ALE.
In terms of such software considerazions, -hs publication
discusses thre^ conditions which might result if a threat to
a computer system were realized : DATA INTEGRITY (eg.
destruction or unauthorized modifications to data); DATA
CONFIDENIIALITY (ie. a compromise of classified data) ; and
ADP AVAIIAEILITY (pertaining to the amount of time that a
computer system can te returned to service after failure)
.
To provide structure and order to the recording of the
risk assessment findings, the ?IPS PUB supplies the work-
sheet presented as figure 2. 3 Such a worksheet might
simplify the record-keeping aspect of the process, but it is
only a suggestion - if used, it should be formatted or











































































On this particular worksheet, data files ara listed sepa-
rately, and arranged by application. Impac- and frequency
estimates and ALZ(s) for each category of -hr-^at are then
listed alongside the associated file. A ccmmen-s column is
provided to allow for an amplification of the figures shown.
As an additional guide to using these work sheets, the FIPS
FOB presents a practical example (for a small organizaticn)
of a complete risk assessment.
The fliS PUB attempt to structure the risk assessment
process adds a degree of credibility to the overall methcd-
ology. Hcwever, it is unreasonable to expect that the whole
process can be carried out as a "cookbook" method. There
are definite limits *c structuring such a task, particularly
in areas such as identifying and estimating the threats
against a facility. In short, "ADP risk analysis is a tech-
nique which reliss heavily en the intuition, experience and
technical knowledge cf the team members" [Ref- 30].
H. COHHENT DIRECTIVES
Approximately a year after the release of FIPS PUE 65,
the NES distributed a ten-page document entitled "Risk
Analysis Standard". The purpose of this document was simply
to standardize the terminology and concepts behind the DOD
philosophy for conducting risk assessments. It did not
supply any specific guidelines or methodologies.
Finally, in August, 19 82, the DON approvf^d and distri-
buted OEiJAVINST 5239. 1A, a full and comprehensive manual
describing the Navy's AD? Security program. A significan-^
portion cf this manual addresses the approved OCN risk
assessment lethodolcgy, complete with forms and specific
directions. The procedural aspects of this methodology will
be presented as a practical framework for a risk assessment
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that cculd be ccLduct^d at *he Naval Postgraduate School.
in Chapter 4.
This chapter has described how the carr ently-approved DON
nethodoloay has evolved over the years. Figure 2.U shews a
time line cf the events leading ap to the distribution of
































































































III. IN-HOOSE VS CONTEACTOAL SUPPORT
A. GENEfiAI
With the distribution of 03B Circular A-7 1 in 1978 came
the reguiiement that a "Risk Assessment" (some-imes refarrad
to as a "Risk. Analysis") be conducted at each computer
installation operated by a federal agency. Whila the risk
assessment loethcdolcgy currently recognized within the
Department of Defense is a manual syst3m, there are commer-
cial software packages available, notably PANAUDIT by
Pansophic Systems, which could facilitate the "number-
crunching" aspect of risk assessments. Unfortunately, this
particular software is only IBM-compatible, and thus has
limited application tc Navy computer systems.
In the past few years, numerous government directivas and
guideliTiSS en me thodclcgies for conducting risk assessments
have teen disseminated. liany of these have resulted frcm a
joint effort on the part of government and commercial
industry. In 1977, in an effort to perfect a mere concise
methcdolcgy that could be applied to various sizes and types
of computer systems within the Department of the Navy,
COMNAVDAC let a contract wita Systems Development
Corporation (SDC) to divelop and document such a methcd-
clogy. This contract, involving contractor support
services, falls under the Policy/Program Review category
outlined in NAVMATINST 4200. 50C. The justification for
contracting cut such a service was undoubtedly a matter of
the expertise held by the commercial marketplace. The
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result of the contract with SDC is containsd in NAVDACINST
5510.1, the Department of tha Navy ADP Security Manual.
While still in draft form, the distribution of this manual
will serve as an excellent reference for those Naval agan-
cies about to initiate a risk assessmant.
''
• lh~. Ne^l L2I. Contractual Support
Many gcvernnient directives pertaining to ADP
Security provide guidance on tha in-house personnel an
agency !!iust use to form their risk assessmant team. Such
personnel generally include representatives from ADP
Operations Management, Systems and Applications Programming,
Hardware Maintenance, Communications Sngjineeriiig , Internal
Auditing, and the Security Staff. Since a comprehensive
risk assessment is a time-consuming process, diverting the
services of these individuals from their normal iuties could
well create a hardship within their divisions or dapart-
nients. This potential hardship was recognized by personnel
at NAVCAC who began to consider the possibilities of
allowing for contractual support in conducting risk assass-
mants. Although previous directives only discussed
conducting risk assessments in terms of using in-house
personnel resources, NAVDACINST 5510.1 mentions that quali-
fied ccrtractors may ba used with prior approval from
NAVDAC.
2 • 1 £ r ot 1 yp e for a Contracted Risk Ass ess me nt
In early 1980, personnel at the Fleet Numerical
Oceanography Center (fNOC) in Monterey, California, began to
have serious doubts about their ability to conduct an
in-hcusa risk assessment. Tha computer configuration at
FNOC, consisting of cumerous large-scale mainframes, ccmmu-
nicaticns networks and devices, minicomputers, and peri-
pherals, was extremely large and complex. It would be very
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difficulT to spare the key parsonnel needed on th~ risk
assessment team from their everyday d'aties. Witn this ir.
mind, the ADP Security Officer ar FNOC wrote -o NAVDAC
asking fcr guidance en using contractor assistance. NAVDAC,
which had teen giving this issue a great deal of thougnt,
decided to use FNOC as a prototype for future contracted
risk assessient efforts. To this end, NAVDAC offered to
lend technical assistance, provide liaison with the
contractor and other knowledgable government agencies, and
oversee the entire process. The government agencies to be
involved (directly or indirectly) m the process are these
shown in figure 3.1, which was extracted from NAVDACI:1ST
5510. IX [Ref- 33]. These agencies roughly parallel these
which play a key role in faderai acquisition policies and
procedures.
3 . S tandar d iz a,t ion in Con tr acted 3 isk Assessments
While the end result of this contract effort was to
te a ccmcleted risk assessment, it rfas also serving as a
standard against which future risk assessments could be
conducted. Thus, as concerns arose during the project,
NAVDAC documented them and considered ways in which the
process cculd be enhanced and standardized. This study will
briBfly summarize the events that occurred during FNOC's
risk assessment, shew how NAVDAC monitored and ccntrclled
the whcle process, and describe how NAVDAC has streamlined
the system to facilitate contractor support on any activi-
ty's risk assessment.
4 . Ereliminarv E fforts
NAVEAC's first pricrity in assisting FNOC was to
gather a pool of personnel whose technical expertise would
facilitate the project. To this end, FNOC was provided a















































Figure 3.1 DON/&DP security Organizational Relationships.
Services frcm Navy Regional Data Automation Centers
(NARBACs)". FNOC* 3 task: va s -^o generate a letter reguesring
technical support services from NA3DAC, San Francisco.
Included in this letter was information pertaining to
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project title, requesting ccramand, type of request, objec-
tives, security classification, and funding. Identifying
the source of the funding is an important consideraxion m
requesting NARDAC services. "Commencing in fiscal year 1982
all Navy cusromers of a NAHEAC, except Navy industrial Fund
Activities, will be supported on an entirely mission funded
basis ... Dnprcgrammed costs which cannot be accommodated will
be subject of discussion between the NARDAC and the customer
to determine if other means of funding are available"
[Ref. 34]. In this situation, FNOC had budgeted $100K for
the risk assessment project, and the NARDAC had no funds
available. It was thus determined that FNOC would remit the
$100K to the NARDAC, who along with NAVDAC, would use the
funds to cover the costs of the government* s technical
suppcrt personnel and the contractor's fees.
Once the method of funding had been determined,
NAVDAC sent technical experts from the NARDAC, NAVELZX, and
NESEA (Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Activity) to
FNOC to discuss the program with ADP Security personnel.
These personnel outlined the project and generated a docu-
ment on FNCC* s computer assets for use by the ccrtractcr.
NAVCAC, in the meantime, was using inputs from this group to
generate a plan of action and milestones that the contractor
would be expected to follow.
5- The Contract
NAVEAC handled all the requirements for negotiating
and awarding the contract. The details, however, on the
negotiaticns, evaluation, selection, and award were not
available to the authors. After the negotiations had been




Ey tha time the SDC personnel arrived at FNOC, they
had been in constant touch wirh zhe project manger at
NAVDAC, and were well aware of ^he tasks expec-ed of them.
By interviewing personnel from all areas of FNOC's organiza-
tional components, reviewing computer ccnf igura-icn sche-
matics and documentation, penetrating computer security
vuln arabilities and merging them v/ith potential threats,
they were able to assess FNOC's security posture and produce
the required documentation and Annual Loss Expsctancy (ALE)
figures.
6. Future Risk fl ssess m ent Contracts
Since a risk assessment contract will call for a
study or analysis of the security aspects of an existing
computer system, it will have to adhere to the requirements
of NAVMAIINST 4 200. 50C which addresses contractor support
services. If FNOC's contract was any indication, future
risk assessment contracts will undoubtedly exceed $50k, and
thus will require legal reviaw and approval by "...a level
no lower than Flag or General Officer or individuals in the
Senior Executive Service (SES)" [Ref. 31].
In an effort to make FNOC and its parent command.
Commander, Naval Oceanography Command (CNOC) , more autono-
mous in contracting for future ADP security -re la ted
services, KAVDAC recently drafted a letter in which the
subject line r=ads, "Automated Data Processing (ADP)
Security Accreditation and Contractor Assistance". This
document will be invaluable to any Naval activity consid-
ering contract support in complating a r:.sk assessment.
Although the information will not br afforded general
distribution, NAVDflC is amenable to providing it when
requested by a Navy activity. The several enclosures to the
document constitute sample ADP security contracting docu-
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ments, which as NriVDAC mentions, masx be tailored *o
specific tasking requirsments and coordinated with the local
Navy Eegicnal Contracting Center. NA7D^C's purpose m -his
effort is "...an attempt to assure that Navy activi-ies
receive quality contractor ADP security reports and products
for dollars invested" [Bef- 32].
Affong the enclosures is a sample statement of work
which may be tailored and included as part of an activity's
Bequest for Proposal (RF?) , or in NAVDAC terms. Task Order
or Task Bequest, The sample not only addresses risk assess-
ments, tut ciloo includes other ADP security areas wnich may
be candidates for contractor assistance : Risk Assessment
Planning, Contingency Plan Testing, and Security Training.
It is the jcb of an activity's ADP Security Officer to write
a task request based on the statement of work, describing
the specific ar=a of the work required. NAVDAC's sample
work statement has specific guideli^nes on the necessary
wording, including a list of military publications to which
the contractor must be responsive, and a list of required
deliverables such as summary progress reports, schedule of
performance, and contract financial progress reports. The
sample work statement also includes an option to extend the
term of the statement of work. This will be renewable at
prices stated by the contractor and at the option cf the
government. In addition, NAVDAC provides guidance on the
Gcverr.mert-Furnished Equipment and documentation tha-^ an
activity should be prepared to picviie the contractor.
Other documents NAVCAC has included as samples are : the
Contract Security Classification Specification, detailing
the security considerations and access requirements;
Contractor Personnel Qualifications Statement, describing
the minimum qualifications expected of the contractor
personnel assigned tc the project; Personal vs Nonpersonal
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Services Questionnaire, a document used by the cont;racri-g
officer zo determine whether or net the solicited service is
nonpersonal; and the Contract Data Requirements Lis*, which
describes the required deliverables. Thise are all standard
requirements for an RFP, but rhey have been uniquely
tailored for a Risk Assessment application.
As cf 28 July 1982, NAVDAC had approved six organi-
zations to he included on the Bidder's idailing List. These
organizations and their qualifications are shown in figure
3.2. At the time of this writing, three were qualified to
conduct risk assessments, but only two of these had DON
approval. Two of the organizations listed were small busi-
nesses.
Each of these vendors will be notified of a task
request by the Contract Administration Office (CAO) .
Vendors are required to pick up the task request within a
week cf notification. NAVDAC refers to vendor responses as
"Task Order Proposals" (TOPs). As is the case with standard
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7. Eicposal Evaluations and Selection
Infcrmation required in a TOP for a risk asssssmen^
includas "the number of man-hours by skill cat<=gory by task
and sufctask, milestone dates, xravel costs, proposed pricing
arrangements, personnel resumes, and -schnical approach"
[Ref. 32]. The function of the activity's technical evalua-
tion hoard, chaired by the ADP Security Officer, who is
generally assigned as project manager, will be to evaluate
these factors.
NAVEAC stresses the impor-cance of ccntracxor
personnel qualifications in evaluating and selecting the
contractor. Particular emphasis is placed on personnel
weighting factors, with the result ^hat factors onher than
cost may weigh heavily in the selection of one contractor
over another. The list of qualifications for contractor
personnel are quite comprehensive. Particularly important,
especially for the lead person assigned by the contractor,
is experience in computer center operations, ADP Bisk
Assessment methods, system software generation, computer
security, telecommunications security, and computer hardware
and interccnnections. A proposal which describes personnel
with less than these qualifications may be considered "non-
responsive". In order to promote continuity and stability
throughout the length of the project, NAVDAC also encourages
considering the contractor's response to the requirement
that "50 percent of original contractor personnel arriving
on a Navy site to perform a risk assessment will remain on
site for the duration of the contract" [fief. 32].
Evaluation of cost factors will generally be handled
by the Procuring Contracting Officer of the Navy Regional
Contracting Center. This will exclude consideration of the
cost of preparing the TOP, which, as is the cass with
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conveEt icnal RFPs, is done at -he expanse of zae ccnTract or
.
Howaver, those prices which will b= recognized include "all
direct labor, overhead, general and ada^nistr ative expenses,
plus an amount for profit" [Hef- 32]. In this regard, mosT:
risk assessment contracts will probably be of the
Cost-plus-fixed- fee type. Based on NAVDAC's general
guidance for evaluation factors and weightings, a proposed
Internal Score Sheet for any activity's TOP evaluation is
included as figure 3.3 . The reasoning for the discrepancy
between experience and past performance is as follows :
experience in all areas listed is crucial, and while past
performance on related contracts would certainly be a
desired feature in a contractor, chances are that few will
have dealt directly with risk assessments (considering that
they are a relatively new requirera€»nt) . Price factors
should ccnstitut? about 20 percent of the total weighting.
After the contract administrator has completed the negotia-
tions, the selection is made, and "a finalized Task Order
will be executed by the contractor and the contracting
officer" [Ref. 32].
B. CCNCIDSIONS
NAVEAC's recognition of the need for allowing contractor
assistance in conducting computer risk a3ses3aen*-s is both
admirable and realistic. Even if an activity could spare
the personnel necessary to conduct a risk assessment, there
would undoubtedly be a lack of expertise in the necessary
policies and procedures. At this stage of the game, where a
risk assessment is still a relatively new and complex pheno-
menon, few people understand what it is, let alone hew to
conduct an assessment. (This will undoubtedly change,





1. Technical Approach -- weight 30 pcints
a.) Understanding of Task
1.) Bisl( Assrssn?nt
2.) flathcdoiogy
b.) Hespansivan^ss to specifications
in Task Request
c.) Appropriateness of approach
1.) Activity's ecvironien t/ops
2.) Activity's coiputer configuration
3.) DON-approved risk isssssaent
requireaents
2. Experience — weiqht 30 points
A.) Coaputer canter Operations
B.) ADP aisk Assessment flarhods
C.) Systa* Software Generatioa
D.) Coapatar Security
S.) Telecoaaanications Security
P.) Coaputer Hardware and Interconnections
S.) Clearance coaaeasurate with the highest
level contained in the systpa
3. Past Perforaanca — weight 15 points
A.) Conducting Risk Assessaents
B.) Parforaing ADP Sacurity-ralated projects

















0-55. Location — weight 5 points
(with the understanding that 50% of the original contractor
personnel raaain on site for the duration of tha contract).
OFFEROB :
ETALOATOB
Figure 3.3 Contractor Evaluation Score Sheet-
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While specific details and samples of ccntracr dccumezts
are available to any activity requesxing them, NAVCAC
encourages tailoring them to the activity's needs. As top
management, security personnel, and computer specialists
become mere educated in the risk assessment phencmencn, the
need for such specific guidance will dwindle. In the mean-
time, gcvernment resources will be saved by avoidu.ng the




IV. A FBAjJEWORK FOE CONDUCTING A RISK ASSESSMENT AT NPGS
Th€ repartmsnt of rhe Navy Automatic Data Processing
Security Program was rscently promulgated by
CPNAVINST.5239. 1 A on August 3, 1982. The instruction
provides policy and guidance to commanding officers
concerning the establishment of local auxomatic data
processing (ADP) security programs. Each command's program
should be designed with the goal of achieving accreditation
by the appropriate designated approving authority (DAA) . In
particular, each activity must develop an activity ADP
security plan (AADPSP). This plan must be approved by the
Commander, Naval Data Automation Command (COMNAVDAC) . The
AADPSP should document current security environment, estab-
lish program objectives, and outlina a plan of action and
milestones (POAM) for security program implementation. An
item that will be included in the POAM is the completion of
a risk assessmerat. A risk assessment may be conducted inter-
nally if an ADP activity has the necessary axpertise
Commercial assistance is available to conduct a risk assess-
ment, CCMNAVDAC maintains a list of authorized contractors
and retains approval authority for contractor selection.
This chapter provides a framework for conducting a risk
assessment at the Naval Postgraduate School. A framework, in
the absence of theory, is helpful in organizing a complex
subject, identifying the relationships between the parts and
revealing the areas in which further development may be
required £Hef. 35]* A risk assessment at a naval activity
must be governed, of course, by OPNAVINST. 5239.1 A. However,
this instruction is very broad in scope and covers the
entire ADP security spectrum. It should be helpful to have
the necessary steps fcr a risk assessment , applied to the
Naval Postgraduate School, presented in this framework.
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A risk assessment invclvas a detailed examination cf all
the aspects cf a computer system: hardware, software, data,
procedures, etc. The use of these assets, that is, -hs use
of the ccmputer systems at the Naval Postgraduate School,
including the IBM 3033AP system in the irf.C. Church Computer
Canter, various mini and microcomputers in Spanagel Hall,
and independent units obtained under grant by several prof-
essors, spans virtually all departments and includes
faculty, students, and military and civilian staff. This
fact implies that a significant amount of cooperation
between different organizations will ba reguired to success-
fully ccirplete a risk assessment. This endeavor requires
command attention at upper levels to impress upon all
concerned the importance with which the command views a
subject cf this nature. With this understanding, a project
cf this magnitude should produce meaningful results which
will serve several purposes;
1) Enable the Naval Postgraduate School to proceed
successfully along the path to AD? security
accreditation.
2) Provide documentation sta-cing the current condition
of security with respect to the computer sysxams
at the Naval Postgraduate School.
3) Provide a reference for quantitatively evaluating
security countermea sures.
U) Provide a platform from wnich improvements in
command security posture can be built.
A- INITIAL STEPS: PERSONNEL SELECTION AND SECURITY SURVEY
The initial step in undertaking this project, is to iden-
tify the personnel who will participate as members of the
risk assessment team. Expertise from various disciplines
such as computer science, management, and administrative
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sciance will be required. Personnel selection is a vary
delicate subject in the commercial environment. Donn Parker
of the Stanford Research Ins-citute (SRI), at the 1977
National Computer Conference, criticized the concep- of a
risk assessment team made up of key company personnel. A
team approach gives a relatively large number of einployees a
virtual inventory of data processing vulnerabilities. It
may be prudent to have risk assessment team members partici-
pate in detailed analyses only on a need-to-kncw basis.
[Ref. 40] Hcwever, this situation will not pose a problem at
the Naval Postgraduate School. Given the relatively tran-
sient nature of students and staff at this institution, the
following recommendations for staffing this project are
proposed. The position of project manager should be
assigned to the ADP security officer. The tasks which this
position entails are quite consistent with the duties of the
ADP security officer. Additionally, the participation of
studenxs from the Computer Systems Management and the
Computer Sciencs curricula should be solicited. The
majority of the work required in this project could be
completed by students. The risk assessment, may serve as a
Thesis project for several teams of interested students.
Faculty members of the Computer Council could function in
the role of thesis advisors while maintaining an active
interest in the risk assessment process. The project could
be broken into three distinct phases. Students partici-
pating in these phases would build directly upon the work
accomplished by earlier students. A proposed phased organi-
zation might be:
1) Security Survey, Asset Identification and Valuation
Phase
2) Threat and Vulnerability Evaluation Phase
3) Computation cf Annual Loss Expectancy and Evaluation
and Selection of Additional Countermeasures Phase
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Ths formal assignment of personnel to the Risk
Assessment Team is accomplished by the issuance of the Risk
Assessment Team Charter. The charter is generated by -he
command itself and identifies -chose personnel who compose
the team. Since studenrs will be participating in this
endeavor, periodic updates to this docum^ni will be
required. The document: lists the objeciives of the team and
details the authority and responsibility of each person.
The charter also states the products which the team is
expected to produce.
The next step in the overall process is to conduct an
ADP security survey. A sample survey is listed in the ADP
Security manual [Ref. 36]. An item which will be needed to
ensure that the survey is complete is a listing of all ADP
equipaent located at the Naval Postgraduate School. The
survey should encompass all equipment so that its results
can be interpreted with seme degree of confidence. The
results provide an indication of the current security situa-
tion and also may shew how much effort will be required to
conduct the risk assessment. It should be noted that a
complete and accurate listing of all equipment is crucial to
the success of the overall assessment. Failure to include
certain equipment may invalidate any assessments made on
ether equipment affected by missing items. The major compo-
nents of the IBK 3033A? system are listed in an NPGS pabli-
cation, "Introducticn to the Church Computer Center". Of
course, this information should be verified prior to use in
this endeavor.
The vast majority of the users are not working with
high-value data, but rather with routine, academically
oriented material. No classified data is supposed to be
stored on the IBM 3033AP system. Additionally, most of the
processing done at the Church Computer Center is not in
support of fleet operations. The results of the survey
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indicate some directicns for the risk assessiisnt to oursu^.
The formal resulxs of the survey should be compiled and
submitrsd as an apper.dix to t.he risk assessmenr dccumer.t.
The results of the survey also impact upor. the risk
methodology selected. As the kDP Security manual states,
"the decisicn (ccncsiring which methodology to use) should
be based on rhe complexity of -che ADP environment. The
complexity is governed by the level of da-a processed,
security mode of operation, ADP sys-em configuration and
location, and the criticality of rhe mission." [Ref. 37]
There are two methcdologies available. The most common
methcdclcgy for ADP activities is listed in the Security
manual as Methodolgy 1. This methodology appears to be
suitable for a risk assessment at the Naval Postgraduate
School. Methodology 1 is the standard methodology us€d in
most ADP environments and provides for suitable inreraciion
between threats and losses. The risk assessment conducted
according to methodclogy 1 can be divided into several
phases as shown in figure 4.1. As previously mentioned,
these phases could quite conveniently be assigned to
students as thesis prcjec-s. The successful completion of
each phase is well within the capabilJL-ies of interested
students
.
B. ASSET IDENTIFICATION AND VALOATION
The next phase in this process consists of asse- identi-
fication and valuation. Some crucial irems of information
are needed to properly complete this phase. As previously
menticned, a complete, up-to date list of all computer
system assets is required. The Computer Council is tasked
with maintaining an inventory of all hardware assets
(Ref- 38]- They should be able to provide the necessary










1 THREAT AND |
1 VULNERABILITY EVALOATION 1
i
1 ANNOAL LOSS EXPECTANCY (
1
EVALUATION AND SELECTION OF
ADDITIONAL C OUNTERME AS URES
Figure 4.1 Majox Steps of Method I Risk Assessment.
kays to the succass of ths risk assessnisn-. Otherwise, the
possibility exists tha~ some piece of ADP equipmenr r.o-
lisxed, and so not considered in the risk assessman*, iDay
somehow interact with equipment thar is consiisred. The
thraat and the associated loss may invalida-e -he assess-
ments made previously on related equipment.
The other elamenta crucial to this phase are the inpact
value ratings. The risk assessment ream will determine the
impact value ratings. The ADP Securmy manual giv^s seme
general guidance for assigning these values. Since the
major purpose of a risk assessment is -o provide a quantita-
tive base for evaluating the cost-effectiveness of counter-
measures, the importance of these values cannot be
overstated. Primary input for the values associated with




Thers are four typas cf irapacxs for which each asset




<4) Denial of service
The ADP Security manual provides a concise defini-ticn of
these impacts. Each asset must be evaluated with respect to
these itsms. If an impact affects an asset, then a monetary
value reflecting that effect should be assigned. The impact
value rating is associated with the monetary value. This
stage will require close coordination between the students
evaluating the assets and those members cf the team who
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3100




Figure U.2 Sensitive Data 7alue Guidelines.
determine the asset impact value ratings. Thi AD? Security
Manual provides guidelines for the impact of disclosure of
sensitive data. These values are listed in figure 4.2.
There are standard forms which should be used to record
the asset impact and valuation studies. The appropriate
form for this phase is designated OPNAV 5239/7. An example
cf this fcrm is provided in Appendix I.
61

C. THREAT AND VOLNEBABILIT I EVALUATION PHAS3
Tfce next phase in the risk asssssm&nt process is rh^
threat and vulnerability evaluation. According to -h^j meth-
cdolcgy, all threats must be evaluated -o estimate how often
a "successful" attack may occur. By definition, a
"successful" attack is one tha- resulrs in a definite
adverse impact on the activity.
This phase will also require a grea- deal of ccmiaunica-
tion between the members of the risk assassmt^nt -earn and the
staff of the computer center. For certain threats such as
power outages, the frequency rating could oe determined by
examining historical data. Hcwever, input from the computer
center staff may prove valuable when attempting to determine
frequency ratings for threats which ar^ highly technical,
such as errors in the operating system software. Each
threat must be evaluated with respect to the same four
impact areas as the assets, that is, modification, destruc-
tion, disclosure, and denial of service. For certain
threats which have never, and hopefully will never, occur
there may be some difficulty in assigning threat frequen-
cies. There is no sound statistical base for assigning
probatilitirs to human behavior prooleras. One method to
approach this problem is to use the Delphi technique. This
raethcd involves having different individuals evaluate a
particular probability several times to reach a consensus.
This technique should provide a probability estimate which
may offset the lack of a human experience base. [Ref. U1 ]
A great deal of time and effort will be required during
this phase. The more imagination which is applied to devel-
oping the threats and their potential adverse effects, the
more accurate the final risk assessment will be. As a




The ADF Security manual provides a list cf sev-sral
example threats. However, this list is certainly not all
inclusive. Threats which ara particular to the Naval
Postgraduate School computer system, such as the vulner-
ability cf the back-up power supplies and its location on
the flight paths of the Monterey County Municipal Airport
must be considered . The scope of this risk assessment is
all-enccmpassing. Much imaginative thinking will be
required during this phase of the undertaking, however, the
payoff ii: terms cf usable output should make it worthwhile.
The threats should be defined to minimize overlap. The
reason for this concern is generated by the method of
computing the annual loss expectancy, which will be
addressed in the next step of this phase.
The threat and vulnerability evaluations should also be
documented en standard forms. kr. example of this form,
OPNAV 5239/8, is enclosed in Appendix I. The information
that should be described for each threat includes a general
narrative about the threat. Examples or the threat should
be listed and any counter measures which are currently in
effect should be noted. Also, any unique circumstances of
the command which might contribute to the threat should be
discussed.
As with th* previous phase, this portion of the risk
assessment could also serve as a thesis project. Again,
however, it must te emphasized that close coordination
between the risk assessment team and the computer center
staff is necessary to ensure that every potential threat is
considered and that every frequency rating represents a
realistic estimate.
Aftar completing the asset valuation and threat evalua-
tion phases, the next step is to compute the annual loss
expectancy values (AIE) . This step provides the quantita-
tive results which will be used to evaluate addititonal
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security measures. The ADP Securiry manual describes a
mechanical, fairly straight-forward procedure to dsxermine
these figures. The impact dollar value ratings and the
successful attack frequency ratings interact to produce an
annual loss expectancy figure for each of the four impact
areas. The individual ALE values for each asset in an
impact area and the individual ALE values for each threat in
an impact area should be added to produce a total ALE value
for each respective impact area. Summing the ALE values
ever the four different impact areas results in the total
ALE value for the system.
As stated in the AD? Security manual, the ALE "repre-
sents a quantitative estimate of the potential average
yearly financial less resulting from the modification,
destruction, disclosure of data, or denial of services
because of existing vulnerabilities which may perra:Lt identi-
fied threats to be realized." [Bef- 39] Oni can see that
the types of results which are derived, namely, quantitative
figures cf annual Ices expectancy, are based totally upon
the estimates made in earlier phases. For the ALE figures
to be meaningful, it is clear that a great deal of care must
be taken to develop reasonable asset valuations and impact
area dollar ratings. Also, tne threat evaluation and
successful attack frequency must be consistent and not exag-
gerate any particular area without justification.
D. EVALUATION AND SELECTION OF ADDITIONAL CODNTERMEASOEES
After the annual loss expectancy values have been calcu-
lated, the evaluation of additional countermeasures can be
conducted. The procedure involves determining whether the
additional countermeaures would benefit the overall security
posture and result in a decrease in the annual loss expec-
tancy value. Cost-effectiveness is the criteria for
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decision- ma king when considering any additional coun-era-sa-
sur2s. Essentially, avery count armeasurs must be svaiuated
to determine if the redaction in the ALE is greaxer than the
cosu of installation and implementation. Counrermeasures
may be directed against specific threats. Some software
countermeasures include the establishing of audit trails,
the use of unique password/authenzicaiiion processes, and the
imposixioE of some type of residue ccnxrol to clear sensi-
tive information which the operating system allows to remain
in resource sharing storage. some hardware counzermeasures
include the emplcymentof protec-icn stata variables, memcry
protection lechanisms, and the use of interruption resistant
power supplies. These are merely a few examples of counter-
measures vihich can be utilized zo iaprcva security. They
may be such that the successful frequency attack ratings in
several iirpact areas are affected.
The procedure for evaluating additional coun termeasures
consists of six steps:
1) Ccuntermeasures which can reduce the vulnerabilities
cf those assets which currently have the higher annual
loss expectancy values should be considered first,
2) The vulnerabilities which would be reduced or elimi-
nated by implementing additional ccuntermeasures shculd
be identified.
3) Assuming that the ccuntermeasure is implemented, the
projected successful attack frequency ratings for each
area should be listed,
4) A projected ALE for each threat affected by the
ccuntermeasure should be calculated by impact area.
5) The projected ALE should b^ subtracted from the
current ALE to show the savings possible by imple-
menting the proposed ccuntermeasure.
6) The ALE savings in each impact area should be summed
and then divided by the annual cost of the ccuntermea-
sure to get the Return -on-Investment (EOT). [Ref. 42]
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Again, thazs is a specific form provided to psrform -thsse
calcula-^icns. An axampl's of zhis fori, OPNAV 5239/10, is
givan in Appendix I.
The Eeturn-cn-InvesiiDent figure is important in the
selecticn of which additional couatarmeasurs to iirplement.
This salection process occurs in an incremental fashion. As
countermeasures are implemented, they affect the overall
security posture of the entire computer center. This effsct
is realized in. a different ALS valua. Since changes in the
ALE will cause a corresponding change in the ROI for a
particular coun term^asure, the co untermeasures must be
considered singly.
The countermeasure with the highest ROI is considered
first. Then, the countermeasure with the next higher ROI is
evaluated with the new ALE resulting from implementation of
the previous countermeasure. This procedure is continued as
long as the respective ROI remains greater than one. The
countermeasuras with R0I*3 greater than one may be ranked
according tc their respective values. A plan to iitpl'rment
these countermeasuras, within budgetary limitations, may
then te determined.
The situation may occur where higher authority directs
that certain countermeasures be implemented. In that case,
these countsrmea sures may take priority for implementation
regardless of their ROI.
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V, iOlOMATED ¥S- MANUAL RISK ASSESSMENT SYSTEMS
A. GENEEAL
At this time, no automated cz computerized risk assess-
ment mexhcdclogy has been approved for use by agencies of
the Federal Sovernmer.i:. This is no reflect-ion on the
Government's lack of interest or distrust in the product; it
is more a matter of an extremely limited market - thsre are
less than a handful of risk assessment software packages
currently available.
One of the few companies in private industry involved in
developing risk assessment software is Pansophic Systems,
Inc., cased in Oak Erook, Illinois. Among the sof-^ware
security products the company offers are : Panaudit, a tool
that can be used for ADP, financial, and statistical
auditing cf computer systems; Panexec, which can be us=d for
auditing, control, backup, and recovery measures; and
Panrisk, an automated risk assessment system for management
planning. Advertisements for Panrisk boast that it is
"...the first system ever to show where to direct your
computer security efforts with quantifiable certainty"
[Ref. 43].
Although the Panrisk system works under the same basic
framework as the manual methods advocated within the DOD, it
has a majcr drawback that greatly limits its usefulness and
applicability to government computer facilities. It is only
compatible with IBM operating systems. However, if Panrisk
had shown any degree of success in the market, ether
computer vendors would have undoubtedly developed similar
systems for Honeywell, Burroughs and others.
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According tc its advsrrising brochure, "Basically,
Panrisk is ths application of a simpla formula to a variety
of rhreats whose results are aggregated -o give a complste
picture cf an organization's total loss potential ov?r a
period of time " [Ref. US]. rha siapla formula for calcu-
lating the Annual Less Expectancy ALS is the same as that
given in FITS PUB 65, although the terminology used differs
somewhat:
ALE = single occurrence loss x occurrence rate
ie. impact x frequency
Skeptics might rightfully question using a computer
system for such a calculation. Panrisk does, however,
produce outputs beyond a simple ALS - it can format, edit,
and generate various reports en risk information to be used
at all levels within an organization. Tnus the package may
have seme merit in its use as a aanagement Information
System (MIS) or as a Decision Support System (DSS) . The
problems, though, arise in the input requirements. In order
for the system to become useful, the organization must
provide the information on its computer resources, threat
probabilities, vulnerabiliti.es, and loss potentials. The
provision of such inputs constitutes the most difficult part
cf conducting a risk assessment. Since such inputs are
largely based on intuition and experience, it could not be
expected that an automated system would be able to produce
them. In general, therefore, tne larket for an automated
risk assessment will be extremely limited. In the fall of
1982, Panrisk was taken off the market for an indefinite
period of time.
In short, an automated system is no better than a manual
one on the input side of the Risk Assessment process.
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Furthermcra, organizations must sxercise caution in consid-
ering buying off-the-shelf Risk Assessment software, since
Rislc Assessments, by their very natire, must be uniquely
tailored to an agency's needs. From the standpoint of a
ESS, however, an automated aisk Assessment could greatly
facilitate a user's understanding and ability to handle
budgeting and security problems.
B. A RISK ASSESSMENT AS A DECISION SOPPORT SYSTEM
An automated Risk Assessment could serve as an excellent
application for a Decision Support System (D3S) . According
to Sprague and Carlson [Ref. 44] the characteristics cf an
effective DSS include : 1.) Support for unstructured (or
semistructured) problems; 2.) Support for all levels of
decision-iaking ; and 3.) a combination of analytical techni-
ques and data presentation techniques. A Risk Assessment
application should include all of these characteristics.
Sprague and Carlson [Ref. 44] discuss three components
that make up a. DSS : 1.) the dialog model, vhich serves as
the user interface tc the system; 2.) the data modal, which
controls and monitors the systsm data bases via a data base
managemsnt system (OEMS) ; and 3.) the modeling component,
which interfaces with the data and dialog models tc perform
mathematical and analytical operations.
The dialog component of a DSS is perhaps the most impor-
tant since, from the user's point of view, it functions as a
virtual system. Th? dialog component must be able to
support a variety cf presentations and output devices,
different inputs, dialog styles and communications, and
above all, must be user friendly. [Bef. 44] For a Risk
Assessment application, *his means that the user (possibly
the ccmniand's Security t^anager or ADP Security Officsr)
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shoald ]:<= afcl* tc selecz the way in which he in puns zc th9
system and the way in which cuxpuns are displayed on the
terminal cr printer. Inpats, which may include kry beard
inputs, jcysticks, function keys, ate, will be constrained
by th€ available hardware, but outputs can have several
options, largely software-supported, which will only be
constrained by the user's and builder's imaginations and
abilitiss. Users may request that the dialog conventions
used include question/answer sessions, menu selections,
graphical displays, and HELP facilities to aid in supporting
the user's knowledge base.
Th€ data cotnponent should be able to support a variety of
data structures and types, while allowing for easy data
access and retrieval [Ref. 44]. This will require an
extremely versatile and capable DBMS, but the current
state-of-the-art is such that these requirements could be
met by a system as simple as DBASE II which is available on
most micrcccmputers. The DBMS of a Risk Assessment applica-
tion will require that the user be provided capabilities tc
generate, update, and maintain data bases composed of, at a
minimum, threat, asset, and vulnerability information.
The ircdeling ccmponent must provide a Model Base
Management Sys-em (MEMS) to allow for the building and crea-
tion cf new models, model manipulation, and the management
of a library of models [Ref. 44]. The models in a Risk
Assessment CSS will te used to calculate ALZs for impact and
threat categcries, ccnpare various AL2s, and mathematically
combine and naniculate ALE figures. This component cculd be
handled ty the programming capabilities of D3ASE II.
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C. DESIGN SOGGESTIONS FOR A DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM
1 . The Pi a 1 eg Ccmponen t
This componen-t should initially allow th^ user
sevaral presentation options, and should be buii* such that
later refinements and enhancements can be made with r=lazive
ease. As the user becomes familiar wit.h th9 system and
feels comfortable in using it, he may want to reduce the
syszem^s HELP facilities in favor of more speed and flexi-
bility. Initially, however, the user's knowledge base will
be small and he will prefer to be "led through" the system.
Assuming the user is at Isast familiar with how to
initialize the system, turn the terminal on and logon, he
will then need to know how to make a call to the Pisk
Assessment DSS. This should be as simple a type-in as
"Begin Risk", "Co Risk", or "Risk" followed by a carriage
return. Ihe initial screen might look like the one shewn in
figure 5,1. An additional option might involve moving a
cursor celcw the desired operation using a joy stick, or
selecting the operation with a light pen. Once an operation
is selected, a new screen showing additional options within
that operation will be displayed. All screens beyond the
initial one will provide "Help" options as well as options
to return to the main menu or end the session. The dialog
model might also present the user with a canned list of
assets, threats, and vulnerabilities, such that he could
delete these that were inapplicable to his organization, and
add those that did apply. This would not only serve to
increase his knowledge base, but would also prevent a lot of
unnecessary terminal work.
Output representations from the operations should
come in a variety of formats. Bar graphs might prove to be




select tha desired operation by typing the corresponding








Display a lisz of computer system asse-s
Display a list cf conipu-cer rhrears
Display a list of computer vulnerabilities
Calculate Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE) values
End Session
WAITING :
Figure 5.1 Initial Screen for a Risk Assessment DSS.
sons cf various ALSs at differen- periods of time. Figure
5.2 illustrates the type of output representation that niigh-
be provid=d by a Risk Assessment DSS. Siailar output repre-
sentaticns could be constructed for the other impact areas
as well as for threats, assets, and vulnerabilities. For a
DSS cf this type, most users will desire outputs that show
comparisons cf relevant information. A prioritized list of
vulnerabilities, for example, would show which vulnerabili-
ties are the most costly in terms of ALils.
2 • Ihe Cat a Com p cnent
The Data Compcnent will oe perhaps the most diffi-
cult to understand and manage. A viable and capable Data
Base Management System (DBMS) will be required to maintain
the vast number of files, the large sizes cf the files, and
the links between the files. In general, an effective DBMS
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NOTES: Ths ALE OF $60K in 1979 rep resents the value
calcalat =d for the comple-icn ct z he 01:iqi nal ALE.
Du€ -:c the additicn of" the Hiqn Sp eed Communications j
System in 1980, rhe increase m sy stem vul nerabilities
brcughx abo
$80Kf .
at a proportionate mcr ease in the ALE (to
Installed coun-t.ermeasures lowered the ALE TO 3 50K in
1981. This status was retained zhi u g a
ALE
198 9.
Exisring pi ans should decrease -he TO $45K by 1983.
Figure 5.2 Bar Graph Output Hepresentation.
DSS , increased data control and sharing, and reduced data
redundancy. [Ref. a5] In building the DBHIS for a DSS, the
designer will chose a data model, whicn is a "methcd of
representing, organizing, storing, and handling data in a
computer" [Ref. 46], The three parts comprising a data
model include : 1.) a collection of data structures; 2.) a
collecticn cf ocerations that can be applied to the data
structures; and 3.) a collecticn of integrity rules that
define the valid states for the structures. [Ref. 46]
The data structures for a Risk Assessment will vary
depending on the type of file, Separate files will, at a
minimum, be required for computer assets, threats, and
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vulnerabilities. Figure 5.3 shows the fields tha- migh- be
contained in such files. Such a field sxructure, however,
will obviously result in a great deal of data redundancy.
For example, one asssT will be exposed to several threa-s;
conversely, one threat may affact several assets. The mcst
wasteful method would be to list every threa- affec-ing a
specific asset and include them as part: of a record in zhe
assex file. Similarly, every asset affecTed by a specific
threat wculd be included as part of a record in rhe threat
file. A more logical method of constructing these files
would be to link the records in each file together using
some type of relational data base model with primary and/or
secondary keys.
fcithin the data model it will be necessary to define
a r elaxicnship between the asset and threat files such that
it can be determined which assets are affected by which
threats, and within which impact categories. The fields
used for this relation will be the IMPACT CATEGORIES (4 ) in
the asset file, and the IMPACT CATEGORIES AFFECTED (U) in the
threat file. By defining this relation, it will be possible
to select a specific asset, link it to an applicable threat,
and calculate the ALE. This type of linkage coaid be
performed by a JOIN operation. According to Kroenke, "The
JOIN cparation is used to combine two relations. A value of
cne attribute in the first relation is compared with a value
of an attribute in the second. If tne two values have a
relationship specified in the join operation, then the
tuples of the relations are combined to form a third rela-
tion." [Bef- 50] Thus, an asset record and a threat record
can be "jcined" by issuing a command such as:
ASSET (IMPACT CATEGORTf (4) =IJ1FACT CATEGORY (4) AFFECTED) THREAT
74

where the value of the IiilP ACT CATEGORY field in -he assst
file is ccmpared to the IMPACT CATEGORY AFFECTED (4) fi^ld in
the thraat file. If the values of -he two fields are equal,
then the two records can be combined re form a single
record. In this way, it can be determined that the record
resulting from -he JOIN operation con-ains an asset, an
applicable threat frcm a specific impac- category, and the
ASSET FILE :
asse- r.ame/asset categor y/descript ion/impact categories
(U)/iiDfact category costs(4)/
THREAT FILE:
threat name/descriptLon/iiapact categories affected (U)/
frequency of occurrence/
VOLNEEABILITI FILE:
vulnerability name/descr iption/thr eats exploiting/
COONTEEMEflSORE FILE:
countermeasur e name/description/cost of implementing/
vulnerabilities a f fecting/-hreat frequencies
af fectinq/
Figure 5.3 Field Layout for Required Files.
frequency of occurrence for that thr=at. The ALE can then
be calculated by multiplying the impact value times the
threat jrcbability.
The operations that will be applied to the data base
files should include, but not necessarily be limited to,
retrieval, update, modification, combination, and summation.
The dialog component should prompt the user for the desired
operation, while allowing him to specify such details as
file rame, field name, etc.
The integrity rules for the field values in the
files may be kept relatively simple. Values for impact
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catigcry oiay easily be constrained to the four categories of
destruction, modification, disclosure, and denial-cf-
service. Numeric values may be limited to a relatively wide
range of values within certain limits. For example,
frequency ratings for threats may contain any decimal value
between .COO and .999. ALE values for the destruction cate-
gory will be equal to the asset replacement cost. By the
same token, no asset ALE may exceed its total replacement
cost
.
3 , I he Modeling Compon ent
"The modeling component is the primary tool for
supporting many of the activities that decision makers will
perfcrm in the process of making decisions and solving prob-
lems" [Ret. 47]. The decisions and problems for a Risk
Assessment application will evolve about the calculation of
ALEs, and determining the areas where the greatest ALE
reductior can occur. Thus, a library of models, consisting
cf permanent, ad hoc, user-built and "canned" mcdrls
[fief. 47] will have to be made available to the user. The
permanent models, these desired by most users, might have
the capabilities shown in figure 5.4. In addition to these,
model generators should be at the disposal of the users m
crder that they may generate and structure tneir own models.
Optional models that may be requested involve activities for
projection, deduction, analysis, creation of alternatives,
ccmpariscn of alternatives, optimization, and simulation.
[Ref. 48]
^ • Integr ation cf Como
o
nent s
"The modal base and its management system must be
integrated with the dialog direct.ly, to give the user direct
control over the operation, manipulation, and use of models"




a~caIcuIa-cion , sunnDanion , and analysis of the ALEs
contributed to by specific threats
ASSET KOCHj :
tlie Ills attributed to specific assets.
VDINEB ABILITY MODEL :
an analysis an^^percenta ge calculation of the ALEs
caused by specific vulnerabilities.
COUNTEEMEASURE MODEL :
an'analylis of fSenfLE reductions that might be brouaht
abcut by the implementation of specific counteraeasufrs.
Figure 5.4 Permanent Model Capabilities.
coupling between the modeling component and the data compo-
nent. "With this direct linkage, models can be updated as
the data values are updated, and modified or restructured
when the data have changed enough to require it" [Ref. 49].
The components and the possible linkages among them may be
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The ccnstruction and design of -hs dialog and modaling
compcnen-ts can be made with relative ease. It is in the
design and development of the data componen-!: that the
majority cf the difficulties will arise. This will cr=ate
additional problems in that a compla-ce and capable DBMS is
critical tc the correct functioning of rhe dialog and
modeling components. The DSS can not function without the
complete integration cf rhe rhree components.
The user is also ccnfronned with severe difficulties in
the actual construction of the databases. While the
designer may be able t.o provide an efficient, mechanism
through which databases may be created and updated, the user
may be frustrated in his attempts to collect ~he data needed
tc include in the databases.
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VI. CONCIOSIONS AND RECOHMENDATIONS
This -chesis has examined various facets of -he concepts
cf risk assessment. The subject is exceedingly complex and
affects virtually all segments of organiza-ion^ which employ
computers tc accomplish their objectives. The multitude of
directives promulgated by various agencies of -he federal
government attest tc the attention being focused en risk:
assessments. The quality of the direction provided in this
area is generally good; however, che instructions are often
lengthy and sometimes written in a style difficult to
follow. The most iiportant point expressed in Chapter Two
is the realization that competent guidance concerning risk
assessments exists. The level of user awareness regarding
the availability of this guidance must be raised. As the
federal government in general, and the Department of the
Navy in particular, allocate more and more funding to
computer systems resources, organizational dependence upon
computer services will grow. This fact necessitates a
corresponding effort towards ensuring tha security of
computer systems. For example, the Naval Regional Data
Automation Center, San Francisco (NASDAC-SF) allocated
several personnel in its Management Control Department to
conduct a risk assessment at that facility. Their study
resulted in a total annual loss expectancy for NAEDAC-SF
amounting to over S8.8 billion. It should be noted that an
astronomical figure like S8.8 billion in no way represents
the actual expected value of losses during a given year.
Father, it is the aggregate ALE resulting from totalling the
individual AL2 * s in each impact area. These figures indi-
cate the relative priorities to be placed on security
measures in different areas. Clearly assets evaluated at
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relative cums of this magnitude warrant significant S'^curity
appraisals. This attention and analysis is precisely the
driving influence behind the rislc assessment directives.
Further dissemination to the proper individuals with appro-
priate authority should increase security efforts in this
area.
Several aspects associated with contracting for risk
assessment services were considered in Chapter Three.
OPNAVINST. 5239. 1A directs all commands with computer system
assets to conduct a risk assessment. The amount of effort
required to conduct a risk assessment may force smaller
commands to seek outside assistance. Naval Regional Data
Automation Centers (NABDACS) are available to provide assis-
tance. However, the various NARDAC's around the country are
staffed at different manning levels, so the amount Df assis-
tance each command is aole to provide may vary. CCMNAVDAC
maintains a list of contractors approved to conduct risk
assessments or t c provide assistance to commands conducting
their own risk assessments.
As the framework for conducting a risk assessment at the
Naval Postgraduate School demonstrates, the task of actually
conducting one is certainly non-trivial. Compiling a list
of all systems assets and procedures and assigning impact
values to them is a complicated , time-consuming endeavor.
Of equal difficulty is determining a list of all potential
threats and their associated frequency ratings. It requires
personnel experienced in the areas of computer operations,
finance and administration. The computation of the ar^nual
loss expectancy and its use in evaluating the potential
benefits of counteraeasures is also an effort which requires
a great deal of precision and judgement. The ADP Security
Manual provides a reasonably clear explanation of these
steps and good background material which is beneficial. The
manual also provides examples for each type of ccmputaticn.
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In ceneral, the emphasis currently being d=vcted -o
security and risk assessments in the Navy is very -inely and
prudent. Given the dependence of the Navy on computer tech-
nology fcr such services as supply processing, tracking
spare parts failure and usage rates, envircnmen-cal fore-
casting, payroll and personnel records and a myriad of ether
tasks, it is easy to imagine -he havoc which could be
created if these services are disrupt-ed. The risk assess-
ment program is a positive effort to study the state of
security with respect to a command's computer systems,
quanitfying the assets and threats and using this data to
evaluate count ermeasures . The criteria for evaluating coun-
termeasures is cost-effectiveness. The risk assessment
procedure appears to te a logical manner in which to deter-
mine the relative impacts of various threats on system
assets utilizing this criteria.
It wculd be difficult, if not impossible, to quantify
the exact value of the risk assesment itself. Since the
overall purpose of a risk assessment is to justify counter-
measures in order to prevent disasters, hopefully potential
disasters will be averted. Certainly attention will be
directed tc problem areas in security. However, even though
this process has not been quantified, the logic providing
the impetus to conduct such assessments seems well-grounded.
No prccrdure in this area, however, will be successful
unless it receives a sufficient amount of command attention.
The general tendency for most commands is to treat the
security and reliabiltiy of computer services in a "taken-
for-grant£d" manner. The magnitude of the potential
disasters due to the loss of computer services makes a
change in this type cf care-free attitude imperative. The
requirement directing all commands with computer systems to
conduct a risk assessment is an important, ^^iable means of
correctina this attitude. It forces commands to make a
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rational, thoughtful analysis of its systems as direc-ed by
OPNAVINSI 5239. 1A. To derive aaximum profit from ^his
procedure, the command should ensure that all concerned
personnel are aware of the significance of conducting this
exercise. If the risk assessment procedure degenerates into
a "paperwork drill" conducted by some personnel in the lower
levels of the command, then the results may be virtually
worthless.
A. SDGGESTIONS/HECOHHEHDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS
As mentioned previously, the risk assessment at the
Naval Postgraduate School can be completed by students in
the various Computer Systems and Management curricula. This
situation would provide many benefits of both an academic
and practical type, not the least of which ars:
1) Provide participating students with a fundamental
knowledge of the computer security problem.
2) Save the Naval Postgraduate School a consideraoie
amount of money.
The remaining recommendations are directed at the larger
scale prcblem. A measure which would improve both the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of the risk assessment procedure
might be tc establish assist teams at NARDAC's throughout
the country. These teams would be availanle to assist
commands d=siroas of conducting risk assessments by
providing expertise in security areas not normally encoun-
tered by activities as part of their norisal routine. The
establishment of these tiams would serve several purposes:
1) Provide a body of experts to conduct risk
assessments and/or to provide assistance to
commands conducting them.
2) Enable commands throughout the Navy to conduct




Another area which could be improved is to prcvi3e more
definitive guidance to commands concerning the value of
systeiDS assets. Central agencies in Washington, D.C. such
as the Autoiratic Data Processing Selection Of fice (ADFSO) and
the Naval Data Automation Command (N A VDAC) maintain approval
authority and inventories of major systems throughout the
Navy. These agencies should possess data concerning the
costs of various types of hardware, software, and possibly
data. The dissemination of this data could eliminate seme
of the estimating required to get values for systems assets.
A final recommendation concerns the subject of an auto-
mated risk assessment pacicage. Chapter Five has presented
the preliminary design for a Risk Assessment Decision
Support System. A feasibility study, conducted perhaps at
one of the NARDAC's, might be undertaken to assess whether a
DSS of this type would be beneficial and cost-effective on a
Navy-wide basis. To satisfy a wide range of users, this DSS
would have to be extremely user-friendly and capable of
accepting a variety of inputs. It may be that the inventory
of Navy computer systems is so varied that this type of
managenient support aid would not be practical on such a
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2. ASSET DESCRIPTION ANO JUSTIFICATION OF IMPACT VALUE RATINGS ASSIGNED.
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3. IMPACT VALUE RATING BY
MODIFICATION
IMPACT AREA
Q DESTRUCTION DISCLOSURE . DENIAL OF SERVICE
OPNAV S2J9/7 (2-92)

This is ac example of OPNAV 5239/8.
WWAVIMST iZSf.lA
THREAT AND VULNERABILITY EVALUATION WORKSHEET
I. THREAT NAME
2. DESCRIPTION, EXAMPLES. WO JUSTIFICATIOM BASED ON EXISTING COUNTERMCASURES ANO VUtNERABILlTIES
.








This is an example of OPNAV 5239/10
OPfUVINST
ADDITIONAL COUNTERMEASURE EVALUATION WORKSHEET
5239. !«
1. ; or.fEfMEASURE NAME 12. ANNUAL COST 1




p. RETURN ON INVESTMENT 8. TOTAL
ALE
SAVINGS
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